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OPINION 
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SMITH, Chief Judge. 
 Under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), state 
action is immune from Sherman Act antitrust liability. 
This case presents the question of whether a public 
university, Edinboro University of Pennsylvania of the 
State System of Higher Education (“the University”), and 
its nonprofit collaborator, Edinboro University 
Foundation (“the Foundation”), are entitled to such 
immunity. On defendants’ motions to dismiss, the 
District Court held that Parker immunity automatically 
applies to the University because the University is an arm 
of the state. 
 4 
 
 Although dismissal was appropriate, the District 
Court painted with too broad a brush. The University’s 
actions are not categorically “sovereign” for purposes of 
Parker immunity. Because of that, we are required to 
apply heightened scrutiny. We conclude that the 
appropriate standard is derived from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 
U.S. 34 (1985), which requires anticompetitive conduct 
to conform to a clearly articulated state policy. We 
further conclude that, taking the allegations in the 
Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to 
plaintiffs, the University’s conduct withstands Hallie 
scrutiny. Furthermore, because the Foundation’s actions 
were directed by the University, the Foundation is also 
immune. We will affirm in part on those alternative 
grounds and remand with the instruction that the 
Amended Complaint be dismissed without prejudice. 
I 
 This case arises out of the need for student housing 
at Edinboro University, a public university located in 
Edinboro, Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs are private business 
entities that provide off-campus residential housing near 
the University. According to plaintiffs, the University 
conspired with Edinboro University Foundation, a 
nonprofit entity that conducts fundraising on behalf of 
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the University, to monopolize the student-housing 
market. 
 Public higher education in Pennsylvania operates 
under a series of constitutional, legislative, and 
administrative mandates. The Pennsylvania Constitution 
requires the General Assembly to “provide for the 
maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient 
system of public education to serve the needs of the 
Commonwealth.” Pa. Const. art. III, § 14. The General 
Assembly, in turn, enacted legislation creating the 
Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education, or 
“PASSHE.” See 24 P.S. § 20-2002-A(a). PASSHE is “a 
body corporate and politic,” id., governed by a chancellor 
and the Board of Governors, see id. §§ 20-2004-A, 20-
2005-A. Edinboro University is one of fourteen 
constituent institutions of the PASSHE system. Id. § 20-
2002-A(a). The University is governed by its president 
and Council of Trustees. See id. §§ 20-2007-A, 20-2008-
A. 
 At issue in this case is the University’s decision to 
collaborate with the Foundation in order to construct new 
dormitories called the Highlands. In January 2008, the 
Foundation amended its Articles of Incorporation to 
authorize borrowing funds “to acquire, lease, construct, 
develop and/or manage real or personal property.” Am. 
Compl. ¶ 19. The Foundation then signed a “Cooperation 
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Agreement” with the University: the University would 
lease certain property to the Foundation in a favorable 
location, and in turn the Foundation would finance, 
construct, and manage the Highlands dormitories. The 
Foundation issued bonds to raise the funds and began 
construction. 
 Plaintiffs aver that, after construction was 
completed, the University took anticompetitive measures 
to ensure that the Foundation recouped its investment. 
Since 1989, the University maintained a “parietal rule” 
requiring non-commuting first-year and transfer students 
to reside on-campus for two consecutive semesters. On 
May 6, 2011, two and one-half years after the first phase 
of the Highlands dormitories opened, the University 
amended its policy to require certain students to reside 
on-campus for four consecutive semesters or until they 
complete at least 59 credit hours. 
 Plaintiffs brought suit, asserting that the University 
and the Foundation conspired to monopolize the student-
housing market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.1 The Amended Complaint states that 
                                                 
 1 Although not relevant to this appeal, plaintiffs 
also asserted a claim for tortious interference arising 
under state law. 
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plaintiffs experienced a 50% decline in business after the 
University expanded its on-campus residency 
requirement. Plaintiffs also aver that this conduct harms 
students by forcing them to pay higher rates for housing 
and participate in the University’s meal plans. 
 Plaintiffs did not sue the University, conceding 
that the University is an arm of the state subject to 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.2 Instead, 
plaintiffs sued the Foundation and the University’s 
president in her official capacity for prospective relief 
pursuant to Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).3 
                                                 
 2 Because the University is not a party to this case, 
we need not address whether it is entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. See Maliandi v. Montclair State 
Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 85 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[E]ach state 
university exists in a unique governmental context, and 
each must be considered on the basis of its own peculiar 
circumstances . . . .” (citation omitted)); Skehan v. State 
Sys. of Higher Educ., 815 F.2d 244, 249 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(holding that PASSHE was entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity). 
 3 At the time plaintiffs filed suit, the University’s 
president was Julie E. Wollman, Ph.D. Dr. Wollman’s 
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 By Order dated March 1, 2016, the District Court 
dismissed plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint with prejudice 
on the ground that defendants’ conduct constitutes state 
action immune from Sherman Act antitrust liability under 
the Parker doctrine. See Edinboro Coll. Park Apartments 
v. Edinboro Univ. Found., No. 15-cv-121, 2016 WL 
6883295 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2016). This timely appeal 
followed. 
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review of a district 
court’s order granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
apply the same standard as does the District Court. In re 
Vehicle Carrier Servs. Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 71, 79 
n.4 (3d Cir. 2017). Under this standard, the complaint 
must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. 
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). In evaluating the 
sufficiency of the allegations, “we disregard rote recitals 
                                                                                                             
successor and the current president of the University is 
H. Fred Walker, Ph.D. 
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of the elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, 
and mere conclusory statements.” Id. (quoting James v. 
City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012)). 
III 
 We begin with an overview of the applicable law. 
In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), the Supreme 
Court held that the Sherman Act does not prohibit 
anticompetitive state action. That ruling embodies “the 
federalism principle that the States possess a significant 
measure of sovereignty under our Constitution.” Cmty. 
Cmmc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 53 (1982). 
States may “impose restrictions on occupations, confer 
exclusive or shared rights to dominate a market, or 
otherwise limit competition to achieve public objectives.” 
N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 
1101, 1109 (2015). Without Parker immunity, “federal 
antitrust law would impose an impermissible burden on 
the States’ power” to subordinate market competition to 
“other values a State may deem fundamental.” Id. 
 Then nearly half a century after Parker, the 
Supreme Court clarified that “state-action immunity is 
disfavored.” FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 
636 (1992). To ensure that the doctrine is appropriately 
limited, the Supreme Court has devised three approaches 
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to analyzing a state-action defense: (1) ipso facto 
immunity, (2) Midcal scrutiny, and (3) Hallie scrutiny. 
Which test applies depends on whether the relevant actor 
is comparable to a sovereign power, a private business, or 
something in between. 
 The doctrine of ipso facto immunity is the least 
searching. Once it is determined that the relevant action 
is “an undoubted exercise of state sovereign authority” 
undertaken by an actor “whose conduct . . . automatically 
qualif[ies] as that of the sovereign state itself,” that 
conduct is immune without the need for any further 
analysis. Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1110–11 (2015); 
see A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 
F.3d 239, 258 (3d Cir. 2001) (immunity for “direct state 
action” applies “only when the allegedly anticompetitive 
behavior was the direct result of acts within the 
traditional sovereign powers of the state”). The Supreme 
Court has recognized only two such contexts: (1) acts of 
state legislatures, and (2) “decisions of a state supreme 
court, acting legislatively rather than judicially.” Hoover 
v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568 (1984); see Parker, 317 
U.S. at 350–51 (“We find nothing in the language of the 
Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its 
purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents 
from activities directed by its legislature.”). The Supreme 
Court has rejected ipso facto immunity for entities that 
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are “state agenc[ies] for some limited purposes.” 
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975). 
 The most searching level of scrutiny derives from 
the Supreme Court’s decision in California Retail Liquor 
Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 
97 (1980). There, a private party sought Parker immunity 
on the ground that it acted in accordance with state 
policy. To prevent a private party from “casting . . . a 
gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially 
a private price-fixing arrangement,” Midcal, 445 U.S. at 
106, the conduct must pass a rigorous two-part test. First, 
the state must enact a “clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed” policy permitting 
anticompetitive conduct; and second, the State must 
“actively supervise[]” that conduct. Id. at 105 (citation 
omitted). Midcal analysis applies where private actors 
seek to immunize their anticompetitive conduct under the 
Parker doctrine, see, e.g., id. at 106, or where a state 
agency is deemed functionally private because it is 
controlled by active market participants, Dental Exam’rs, 
135 S. Ct. at 1114. 
 Finally, the Supreme Court announced an 
intermediate standard of review in Town of Hallie v. City 
of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985). There, it determined 
that municipalities are exempt from Midcal’s second 
prong—active supervision—but must still comply with 
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the first prong—conformity with a clearly articulated 
state policy. Id. at 40. The Supreme Court observed that 
the municipality was an “arm of the State” entitled to a 
presumption that it “acts in the public interest,” id. at 45, 
the municipality is politically accountable for its 
anticompetitive policies, id. at 45 n.9, and there is thus 
“little or no danger” that the municipality would become 
“involved in a private price-fixing arrangement,” id. at 
47. In dicta, the Supreme Court has suggested that 
“prototypical” state agencies may be subjected to the 
same degree of scrutiny as a municipality. See id. at 46 
n.10 (“In cases in which the actor is a state agency, it is 
likely that active state supervision [Midcal’s second 
prong] would also not be required, although we do not 
here decide that issue.”); Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 
1114 (“[T]he municipality [in Hallie] was more like 
prototypical state agencies, not specialized boards 
dominated by active market participants.”). 
 In sum, the Supreme Court has established the 
following principles: ipso facto immunity applies to state 
legislatures and state supreme courts, but not to entities 
that are state agencies for limited purposes; Midcal 
scrutiny applies to private parties and state agencies 
controlled by active market participants; and Hallie 
scrutiny applies to municipalities, and perhaps state 
agencies. Applying those principles to the facts alleged in 
the Amended Complaint resolves this appeal. 
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IV 
 Because the level of scrutiny for state-action 
immunity turns on the character of the relevant actor, the 
first step of any Parker analysis is to identify the actor 
that performed the alleged anticompetitive conduct. We 
conclude that plaintiffs’ alleged antitrust injury stems 
entirely from the conduct of the University, and we focus 
our analysis accordingly. 
 When beginning a Parker analysis that involves a 
private defendant, it is critically important to determine 
whether the private defendant caused the alleged antitrust 
injury.4 Bedell, 263 F.3d at 258. In some cases, private 
defendants independently engage in anticompetitive 
conduct, such as price fixing, and then seek immunity 
under the “gauzy cloak of state involvement.” Midcal, 
445 U.S. at 106. In such a scenario, full Midcal scrutiny 
is required. Id. But in other cases, Midcal scrutiny may 
not be necessary because the private defendant does not 
act on its own and is merely an adjunct to a government’s 
anticompetitive action. If a governmental actor is 
                                                 
 4 Antitrust injury means “(1) injury of the type the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and (2) that flows 
from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.” 
Bedell, 263 F.3d at 247 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. 
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1997)). 
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independently responsible for causing the alleged 
antitrust injury, “once [it] is determined to be 
immune . . . , the immunity should be extended to include 
private parties acting under [its] direction.” Zimomra v. 
Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 111 F.3d 1495, 1500 (10th Cir. 
1997). “Otherwise, plaintiffs could sue only the private 
parties and by winning antitrust judgments against them, 
could thwart state policies as if there were no state 
[i]mmunity.” Bedell, 263 F.3d at 256 n.35; see also S. 
Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 
471 U.S. 48, 56–57 (1985). In Massachusetts School of 
Law at Andover, Inc. v. American Bar Association, for 
example, this Court found that a private entity was 
shielded behind the ipso facto immunity of the state 
(without need for Midcal scrutiny) because the alleged 
antitrust injury was caused solely by direct sovereign 
action. 107 F.3d 1026, 1036 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 In this case, plaintiffs allege that the public 
University and the private Foundation conspired to 
monopolize the student-housing market. But the only 
alleged actions of the Foundation—amending its charter, 
issuing bonds, building the dormitories, and managing 
the property—are consistent with participation in a 
competitive market. The Foundation’s advantage derived 
entirely from the University’s decision to expand its on-
campus residency rule, which required more students to 
live in dormitories like the Highlands. Plaintiffs have not 
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identified any independent conduct of the Foundation 
that conceivably restricted competition. See Atl. Richfield 
Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990) 
(“[I]njury . . . will not qualify as ‘antitrust injury’ unless 
it is attributable to an anti-competitive aspect of the 
practice under scrutiny . . . .”). 
 Nor is this a case of “hybrid” anticompetitive 
conduct. See Bedell, 263 F.3d at 258.5 Bedell involved a 
Multistate Settlement Agreement brokered between the 
governments of several states and certain tobacco 
manufacturers. The plaintiffs alleged that the Agreement 
established a cartel whereby private tobacco companies 
would be permitted to restrict output. This Court 
observed that the alleged anticompetitive conduct was 
neither “purely private” nor “entirely attributable to the 
                                                 
 5 Bedell’s discussion of Parker is arguably dicta 
because it resolved the appeal based on a different 
doctrine, and then went on to conclude that Parker 
immunity would not have resolved the appeal. 263 F.3d 
at 254. A subsequent decision of this Court, Mariana v. 
Fisher, noted as much, but concluded that Bedell is 
binding. 338 F.3d 189, 201–04 (3d Cir. 2003). That 
section of Mariana, however, was also arguably dicta for 
the same reason. Regardless, we are persuaded by 
Mariana’s embrace of Bedell as binding circuit 
precedent. 
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state.” Id. Rather, the alleged antitrust injury derived 
from a “hybrid restraint,” which “involve[d] a degree of 
private action which calls for Midcal analysis.” Id. (citing 
Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 666–67 
(1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)). But in this case, there is 
no comparable “degree of private action,” such as 
participation in a cartel, “which calls for Midcal 
analysis.” Id. 
 We conclude that the Foundation was merely 
“acting under the direction of” the University. Zimomra, 
111 F.3d at 1500. Therefore, if the University is immune, 
the Foundation must be as well. Motor Carriers, 471 
U.S. at 56–57; Mass. Sch. of Law, 107 F.3d at 1036. 
Given that understanding of the Foundation’s role in the 
challenged conduct, we proceed to analyze how the state-
action doctrine applies to the University.6 
                                                 
 6 Our analysis focuses on the University even 
though it was not named as a defendant in this case. 
Preliminarily, the University is a party in interest based 
on the official-capacity claim against its president. See 
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). But even 
if plaintiffs had only sued the Foundation, “the same test 
should apply to determine state action immunity 
regardless of who the named defendants are.” Zimomra, 
111 F.3d at 1500. 
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V 
 The fundamental question we must decide is which 
tier of scrutiny applies to the University’s conduct: no 
further review (if the University is ipso facto immune), 
Midcal review, or Hallie review. The District Court held 
that the University is ipso facto immune because it is an 
arm of the state. We disagree. Instead, we conclude that 
Hallie review is appropriate because the University is 
more analogous to a municipality than to a private market 
participant. 
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A 
 The District Court held that the University is ipso 
facto immune because the University is an arm of the 
state under the Eleventh Amendment. But those two 
immunity doctrines are not coextensive. Even if the 
University were an arm of the state, the University is not 
“sovereign” for purposes of Parker. Unlike the General 
Assembly or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the 
University cannot legislate anticompetitive policies on 
behalf of the Commonwealth. Thus, the University’s 
decision to expand its on-campus residency requirement 
is not entitled to ipso facto immunity. 
1 
 Sovereign action for purposes of direct Parker 
immunity is “qualitatively different” from state action in 
more familiar contexts. Bedell, 263 F.3d at 254. While 
traditional state action can cover 
inadvertent or unilateral acts of state officials 
not acting pursuant to state policy . . . the 
term “state action” in antitrust adjudication 
refers only to government policies that are 
articulated with sufficient clarity that it can 
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be said that these are in fact the state’s 
policies, and not simply happenstance, 
mistakes, or acts reflecting the discretion of 
individual officials. 
Id. (quoting 1 Philip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust Law ¶ 221 (Rev. ed. 1997)). Thus, conduct 
might be deemed nonsovereign for purposes of Parker 
immunity “even if sectors of state government are 
involved.” Id.; see Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1113 
(recognizing that nonsovereign entities can be “public or 
private”). In accordance with those principles, the 
Supreme Court has recognized ipso facto immunity in 
two limited contexts: state legislation and the decisions 
of state supreme courts, acting legislatively. Hoover, 466 
U.S. at 568. The Court reserved the question of whether 
“the Governor of a State” is ipso facto immune, id. at 568 
n.17, but as described below, has consistently required 
heightened scrutiny for subordinate branches of state 
government. 
 Recently in North Carolina State Board of Dental 
Examiners v. FTC, the Supreme Court addressed the 
status of an “agency of the state” with the authority to 
regulate the practice of dentistry in North Carolina. 135 
S. Ct. at 1107. The dissenting Justices would have found 
ipso facto immunity, providing a simple resolution. See 
id. at 1117–18 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Under Parker, the 
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Sherman Act . . . do[es] not apply to state agencies; the 
North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners is a state 
agency; and that is the end of the matter.”). 
 But instead, the Court treated the regulatory board 
as a nonsovereign actor. It began with the familiar 
principle that “[s]tate legislation” and “decision[s] of a 
state supreme court, acting legislatively” are entitled to 
ipso facto immunity because “they are an undoubted 
exercise of state sovereign authority.” Id. at 1110 
(majority opinion). But the Court declined to apply ipso 
facto immunity to the agency: 
For purposes of Parker, a nonsovereign actor 
is one whose conduct does not automatically 
qualify as that of the sovereign State itself. 
State agencies are not simply by their 
governmental character sovereign actors for 
purposes of state-action immunity. Immunity 
for state agencies, therefore, requires more 
than a mere facade of state involvement . . . . 
Id. at 1111 (citations omitted). 
 The Supreme Court’s treatment of state agencies in 
Dental Examiners continues a long line of similar 
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precedents. As we noted above, the Court found that a 
state bar—a “state agency by law”—did not receive ipso 
facto immunity. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 789–91. “The fact 
that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited 
purposes does not create an antitrust shield that allows it 
to foster anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its 
members.” Id.;7 see also, e.g., Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. 
at 57 (“The circumstances in which Parker immunity is 
available to . . . state agencies or officials regulating the 
conduct of private parties[] are defined most specifically 
by our decision in [Midcal].”); City of Lafayette v. La. 
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978) (plurality 
opinion) (“[F]or purposes of the Parker doctrine, not 
every act of a state agency is that of the State as 
sovereign.”); cf. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46 n.10. 
                                                 
 7 Contrast Goldfarb with the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 
U.S. 350 (1977). There, the Supreme Court found a state 
bar immune under Parker, but only after conducting what 
would later come to be known as Midcal analysis: the 
challenged restraint of trade was the “affirmative 
command of the Arizona Supreme Court,” id. at 359, and  
was “subject to pointed re-examination” by that court, id. 
at 362; see also Hoover, 466 U.S. at 573 (“[T]he court 
itself approved the particular grading formula and 
retained the sole authority to determine who should be 
admitted to the practice of law in Arizona.”). 
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2 
 Applying those principles, we conclude that the 
University is not entitled to ipso facto immunity. The 
University is not a sovereign decisionmaker analogous to 
a state legislature or state supreme court. 
 When the University amended its policy 
mandating a longer term of on-campus residency, it was 
not exercising sovereign powers. Rather, it was 
exercising discretion delegated by the Pennsylvania 
legislature, akin to acting as a state agency. See Hoover, 
466 U.S. at 568 (“Closer analysis is required when the 
activity at issue is not directly that of the legislature or 
supreme court, but is carried out by others pursuant to 
state authorization.”); cf. Mass. Sch. of Law, 107 F.3d at 
1036 (applying ipso facto immunity because “this case 
does not involve a delegation of state authority”). As 
such, the University’s conduct did not represent the 
sovereign’s will “simply by [its] governmental 
character.” Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1111. It 
follows, a fortiori, that the University fits the definition 
of a “nonsovereign actor” for purposes of Parker: “one 
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whose conduct does not automatically qualify as that of 
the sovereign State itself.” Id.8  
 The University, in fact, presents an easier case than 
prototypical state agencies. At most, the University is 
comparable to “a state agency for some limited 
purposes.” Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791 (emphasis added). 
Unlike prototypical state agencies, the University’s 
authority is limited to managing its own affairs and the 
affairs of its students, who voluntarily attend. It does not 
wield regulatory power. Thus, by comparison to other 
divisions of state government that might present closer 
                                                 
 8 Defendants argue that Dental Examiners is 
limited to its factual context—where a regulatory entity 
is controlled by private market participants. But that 
control was not relevant to the Court’s holding that the 
Board was nonsovereign. See Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. 
at 1110–11. That antecedent question was resolved 
simply by the Board’s status as an agency, as conceded 
by counsel for the Board. Id.; see Brief for Petitioner at 
24–25, Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (No. 13-534), 
2014 WL 2212529. Rather, the control by market 
participants was relevant to the next step of the 
analysis—determining whether the Board’s actions, as a 
nonsovereign, are required to meet both Midcal prongs or 
only one. See Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1113–14. 
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cases, the University is clearly not sovereign for purposes 
of Parker immunity.9 
 Because the University is not a sovereign actor 
analogous to a state legislature or state supreme court, its 
pronouncements are not entitled to ipso facto immunity. 
Defendants are “[p]lainly . . . in error in arguing that 
Parker held that all governmental entities, whether state 
agencies or subdivisions of a State, are, simply by reason 
of their status as such, exempt from the antitrust laws.” 
Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 408. 
                                                 
 9 The District Court’s reasoning equates the phrase 
“traditional sovereign powers,” Bedell, 263 F.3d at 258, 
with the phrase “traditional area of state power,” 
Edinboro, 2016 WL 6883295, at *3. While providing for 
higher education is certainly a traditional state function, it 
does not follow that the University wields traditional 
sovereign power. Likewise, in Dental Examiners, 
professional licensing and regulation is a traditional area 
of state power. Yet that was no obstacle to the Supreme 
Court concluding that the Board was a nonsovereign 
actor. Cf. Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1119 (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he regulation of the practice of medicine 
and dentistry was regarded as falling squarely within the 
States’ sovereign police power.”). 
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3 
 Defendants argue that several of our sister circuits 
have recognized broad ipso facto immunity for the states’ 
executive branches. Those cases are distinguishable. 
 In Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. New England 
Newborn Screening Program, 187 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 
1999), the First Circuit conferred ipso facto Parker 
immunity on the Massachusetts Department of Public 
Health. In doing so, the Court recognized that “the status 
of state boards or commissions is open to dispute,” and 
thus limited its holding to situations “where a full-
fledged department is concerned.” Id. at 29. Likewise, in 
Deak-Perera Hawaii, Inc. v. Department of 
Transportation, 745 F.2d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 1984), and 
subsequently Charley’s Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. 
SIDA of Hawaii, Inc., 810 F.2d 869, 875 (9th Cir. 1987), 
the Ninth Circuit found ipso facto immunity for the 
actions of Hawaii’s Department of Transportation. 
 Because we hold that the University is analogous 
to a “state agency for some limited purposes,” Goldfarb, 
421 U.S. at 791, rather than a “full-fledged department,” 
Neo Gen, 187 F.3d at 29, our decision does not conflict 
with those rulings. We continue to reserve the question 
addressed by those courts—whether ipso facto immunity 
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applies to prototypical state agencies or high-ranking 
executive officials acting within their lawfully delegated 
authority. Cf. Bedell, 263 F.3d at 256 (“We have yet to 
address whether the acts of executive officials constitute 
state action that avoids Midcal analysis.”). 
 Finally, defendants rely on Saenz v. University 
Interscholastic League, 487 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973). 
There, the Fifth Circuit found Parker immunity because 
the defendant was “an integral part of the University of 
Texas at Austin,” and therefore “constitute[d] a 
governmental entity outside the ambit of the Sherman 
Act.” Id. at 1028. But Saenz predates every development 
to the Parker doctrine we have discussed in this decision. 
Not only does it predate Midcal and Hallie, but also it 
predates Goldfarb, the first case where the Supreme 
Court held that a state agency is not ipso facto immune. 
Simply put, the analysis we are required to apply did not 
exist at the time Saenz was decided. Accordingly, we join 
those courts that have applied modern state-action 
principles to deny ipso facto immunity to public 
universities. See, e.g., Auraria Student Hous. at the 
Regency, LLC v. Campus Vill. Apartments, LLC, 843 
F.3d 1225, 1250 (10th Cir. 2016); Porter Testing Lab. v. 
Bd. of Regents for Okla. Agric. & Mech. Colls., 993 F.2d 
768, 772 (10th Cir. 1993); Seaman v. Duke Univ., No. 
1:15-cv-462, 2016 WL 1043473, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 
12, 2016); Humana of Ill., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of S. Ill. 
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Univ., No. 84-2373, 1986 WL 962, at *5 (C.D. Ill. June 
3, 1986); Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi. v. Bd. of 
Regents for Regency Univs., 607 F. Supp. 845, 849–50 
(N.D. Ill. 1984); see also Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency 
Med., 988 F. Supp. 127, 183 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(university hospitals). 
 We conclude that the University’s conduct does 
not constitute direct sovereign action under the Parker 
doctrine. While the University is a governmental entity, 
“[a]cting alone,” it is not empowered with the sovereign 
authority to legislate the “policy of the State itself.” 
Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 62–63. 
B 
 Having concluded that ipso facto immunity is 
inappropriate, “closer analysis is required.” Hoover, 466 
U.S. at 568. Ordinarily that entails applying Midcal’s 
rigorous two-part test. But “there are instances in which 
an actor can be excused from Midcal’s active-supervision 
requirement.” Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1112. We 
conclude that this is such an instance because the 
University is more closely analogous to the municipality 
in Hallie than to a private market participant. 
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1 
 The University is exempt from Midcal’s active-
supervision requirement in accordance with the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Hallie. 
 In Hallie, the Court contrasted the incentives of 
municipalities and private parties. It observed that, 
because the municipality was “an arm of the State . . . [, 
w]e may presume, absent a showing to the contrary, that 
the municipality acts in the public interest. A private 
party, on the other hand, may be presumed to be acting 
primarily on its own behalf.” Hallie, 471 U.S. at 45. The 
Court then reasoned: 
Where a private party is engaging in the 
anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger 
that he is acting to further his own interests, 
rather than the governmental interests of the 
State. Where the actor is a municipality, there 
is little or no danger that it is involved in a 
private price-fixing arrangement. The only 
real danger is that it will seek to further 
purely parochial public interests at the 
expense of more overriding state goals. This 
danger is minimal, however, because of the 
requirement that the municipality act 
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pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. 
Once it is clear that state authorization exists, 
there is no need to require the State to 
supervise actively the municipality’s 
execution of what is a properly delegated 
function. 
Id. at 47. 
 We conclude that this reasoning applies squarely 
to the University. Like the municipality in Hallie, the 
University is not a sovereign actor, but is still an “arm of 
the State” presumed to “act[] in the public interest.” Id. at 
45. Unlike a private business, the University’s self-
interest is more closely aligned with certain 
“governmental interests of the State.” Id. By advancing 
the project of higher education—a project blessed by the 
Pennsylvania legislature as a valuable public function—
the University is primarily at risk that “it will seek to 
further purely parochial public interests at the expense of 
more overriding state goals.” Id. 
 Therefore, meeting Midcal’s first requirement—
acting “pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy”—is 
sufficient to ensure that a PASSHE university is 
executing its “properly delegated function.” Id. We thus 
join with the Tenth Circuit, which similarly held that, for 
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“a state created and funded university, . . . a showing of 
active supervision is unnecessary to qualify for state 
action antitrust immunity.” Porter, 993 F.2d at 772; see 
also Auraria, 843 F.3d at 1250; Humana, 1986 WL 962, 
at *5; Am. Nat. Bank & Tr., 607 F. Supp. at 849–50. 
2 
 The only Supreme Court decision explicitly 
requiring full Midcal scrutiny for the independent actions 
of a state agency, Dental Examiners, is distinguishable. 
 In Dental Examiners, the North Carolina Board of 
Dental Examiners sought a similar exemption from the 
active-supervision requirement in light of its status as a 
state agency. But the Court held that “the need for 
supervision turns not on the formal designation given by 
States to regulators but on the risk that active market 
participants will pursue private interests in restraining 
trade.” 135 S. Ct. at 1114. Because the Board was 
“controlled by active market participants, who possess 
singularly strong private interests,” the Court treated the 
Board as “similar to [a] private trade association,” 
necessitating full Midcal scrutiny. Id. 
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 The analogous situation in this case would be if the 
Foundation—a private, active participant in the real 
estate market—dominated and controlled the University. 
In such a case, there would be a risk of self-dealing; the 
active market participant would be empowered “to decide 
who can participate in its market, and on what terms,” 
rendering “the need for supervision . . . manifest.” Id. For 
Dental Examiners to apply, plaintiffs would be required 
to identify a “structural risk” that “a controlling number 
of decisionmakers” at the University “are active market 
participants.” Id. 
 Plaintiffs did not plead any facts that plausibly 
give rise to such an inference. We thus conclude that 
Dental Examiners does not mandate full Midcal scrutiny 
for the University. But as we describe below, the 
complaint may be amended to include such facts if they 
exist. See infra Section VI.B. 
*     *     * 
 We conclude that Hallie scrutiny is appropriate for 
PASSHE universities. Absent any special circumstances 
that necessitate full Midcal review, PASSHE universities, 
like municipalities, can be presumed to act in the public 
interest. Ordinarily, therefore, they need only comply 
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with Midcal’s first prong—conformity with a clearly 
articulated state policy. 
VI 
 We now apply the Hallie test to the University and 
to the Foundation. We conclude that the University’s 
conduct is immune under that standard, and that the 
University’s immunity passes through to the Foundation. 
We will therefore affirm in part on those alternative 
grounds.10 See, e.g., Oss Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space 
Agency, 617 F.3d 756, 761 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[W]e may 
affirm a judgment on any ground apparent from the 
record, even if the district court did not reach it.” 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). But 
because further amendment may not be futile, we will 
remand with instructions to dismiss the Amended 
Complaint without prejudice. 
                                                 
 10 We need not, therefore, address defendants’ 
argument that we should affirm on the alternative ground 
of Noerr-Pennington immunity. 
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A 
 The University’s conduct complies with a clearly 
articulated state policy because mandating on-campus 
residency is a foreseeable consequence of the legislative 
mandate to provide appropriate student living facilities. 
 Because “[n]o legislature . . . can be expected to 
catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute 
delegating authority to a substate governmental entity,” 
the Supreme Court has “approached the clear-articulation 
inquiry more practically.” F.T.C. v. Phoebe Putney 
Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1012 (2013) (quoting 
Hallie, 471 U.S. at 43). The clear-articulation test is met 
if an anticompetitive effect is the “foreseeable result” of 
the state’s authorization. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 42; see 
Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415 (a political subdivision need 
not “point to a specific, detailed legislative 
authorization”). 
 Where a state delegates generic contracting 
powers, the clear-articulation test is not met. See Phoebe 
Putney, 133 S. Ct. at 1012 (holding that “general 
corporate power” to enter into acquisitions does not 
clearly authorize anticompetitive consolidation of 
hospital ownership); Cmty. Commc’ns Co., 455 U.S. at 
55–56 (holding that a “neutral” grant of power to enact 
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municipal ordinances does not “impl[y] state 
authorization to enact specific anticompetitive 
ordinances”). But clear articulation may be established 
where “displacement of competition was the inherent, 
logical, or ordinary result” of the authority delegated by 
the state legislature, such that the state “must have 
foreseen and implicitly endorsed the anticompetitive 
effects as consistent with its policy goals.” Phoebe 
Putney, 133 S. Ct. at 1013; see, e.g., Hallie, 471 U.S. at 
41 (the power of a city to exclude surrounding 
unincorporated areas from the provision of sewage 
related services affirmatively contemplates 
anticompetitive effects); City of Columbia v. Omni 
Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 373 (1991) (a state 
statute authorizing municipalities to adopt zoning 
ordinances foreseeably resulted in the suppression of 
competition in the billboard market). 
 In this case, the Pennsylvania General Assembly 
enacted the policy that “[e]ach institution shall provide 
appropriate . . . student living facilities.” 24 P.S. § 20-
2003-A(a). That mandate does more than confer “general 
corporate powers,” Phoebe Putney, 133 S. Ct. at 1011, 
although the University certainly has such powers as 
well, see, e.g., 24 P.S. § 20-2003-A(b). 
 The intention to displace competition is evident 
when the mandate is read in light of common practice 
 35 
 
and the University’s educational mission. See Pa. Const. 
art. III, § 14; 24 P.S. § 20-2003-A(a). As even plaintiffs 
acknowledge, rules requiring on-campus residency are 
“common at many colleges and universities,” and are 
justified, at least in part, by the educational benefits of a 
“living and learning” environment and “the doctrine of in 
loco parentis” (or “the school’s attempts to fulfill a 
‘parental’ role”). Am. Compl. ¶¶ 41–43. It is eminently 
“ordinary” and “foreseeable” that universities would 
consider those benefits and adopt rules requiring some 
term of on-campus residency in fulfilling their mandate 
to provide “appropriate . . . student living facilities.” 24 
P.S. § 20-2003-A(a); cf. Hack v. President & Fellows of 
Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that 
on-campus residency requirements exist at “many 
colleges and universities across the country,” and affect 
“millions of students who have attended those institutions 
in the more than a century since the Sherman Act was 
enacted”); Porter, 993 F.2d at 771 (finding clear 
articulation because a statute delegated a “specific” 
function to “a nonprofit state institution,” a public 
university). 
 It is clear that the General Assembly “must have 
foreseen and implicitly endorsed” such policies. Phoebe 
Putney, 133 S. Ct. at 1013. In fact, according to 
plaintiffs, the University’s on-campus residency rule was 
first enacted in 1989. Am. Compl. ¶ 43. We see no reason 
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why the expansion of that requirement from two 
semesters to four would exceed what the General 
Assembly might have reasonably foreseen.11 
 After this case was argued, the Tenth Circuit 
decided a similar case, Auraria Student Housing at the 
Regency, LLC v. Campus Village Apartments, LLC, 843 
                                                 
 11 Plaintiffs aver that the University expanded its 
rule “purely for financial reasons, specifically to ensure 
occupancy levels in on-campus ‘affiliated’ housing 
generate sufficient revenue to service the $100-plus 
million bond debt incurred by the Foundation to develop 
the Highlands Project.” Am. Compl. ¶ 46. These 
allegations do not alter our analysis. The Supreme Court 
has “consistently sought to avoid” any “deconstruction” 
or “probing of the official ‘intent.’” Omni, 499 U.S. at 
377. 
 Nor are we influenced by plaintiffs’ allegation that 
the University acted ultra vires by failing to engage in a 
competitive bidding process, 24 P.S. § 20-2003-A.1(c.2), 
or by failing to fulfill its mandate “to provide high 
quality education at the lowest possible cost for 
students,” id. § 20-2003-A(a). Parker analysis does not 
“dictate[] transformation of state administrative review 
into a federal antitrust job.” Omni, 499 U.S. at 372 
(quoting 1 Philip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust Law ¶ 212.3b, at 145 (Supp. 1989)). 
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F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2016). The Tenth Circuit applied the 
Hallie test and concluded that the Colorado legislature 
did not clearly express an intent to displace competition 
in the student-housing market. Id. at 1250–51. But the 
Tenth Circuit did not cite, nor did it distinguish, any part 
of Colorado law that grants educational institutions 
discretion in providing student housing that they deem 
appropriate in light of their educational missions. Rather, 
the Court concluded that Colorado law merely grants 
“permission to enter into agreements” and other generic 
powers “that are common in the marketplace.” Id. at 
1251. From that premise, the Court was bound to follow 
Phoebe Putney, 133 S. Ct. at 1012, and Community 
Communications Co., 455 U.S. at 55–56, to conclude that 
there was no clear articulation. But we interpret the 
Pennsylvania statute as conferring more than mere 
contracting powers; we read a clearly articulated 
intention to displace competition in student housing. We 
therefore conclude that Auraria’s application of the 
Hallie test is distinguishable.12 
                                                 
 12 Finally, plaintiffs argue that we should recognize 
a so-called market-participant exception to Parker 
immunity. The Supreme Court, as well as this Court, 
have discussed such an exception in dicta. See Phoebe 
Putney, 133 S. Ct. at 1011 n.4; Omni, 499 U.S. at 379; 
Bedell, 263 F.3d at 265 n.55. The existence of such an 
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 Accordingly, we conclude that the University’s 
conduct conformed to a clearly articulated state policy, 
and therefore constituted immune state action under 
Hallie. Because plaintiffs’ alleged antitrust injury derives 
                                                                                                             
exception is not clearly established. See, e.g., VIBO 
Corp. v. Conway, 669 F.3d 675, 686–87 (6th Cir. 2012); 
Hedgecock v. Blackwell Land Co., 52 F.3d 333, 1995 
WL 161649 (9th Cir. 1995) (table opinion); Genentech, 
Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 949 (Fed. Cir. 
1993) abrogated on other grounds by Wilton v. Seven 
Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995); Paragould Cablevision, 
Inc. v. City of Paragould, 930 F.2d 1310, 1313 (8th Cir. 
1991) (“[T]he market participant exception is merely a 
suggestion and is not a rule of law.”). 
 We need not resolve this issue here. And even 
assuming that such an exception exists, it would not 
apply to this case. A market-participant exception would 
only apply where “[t]he government entity . . . was 
involved in the market as a buyer or seller.” Bedell, 263 
F.3d at 265 n.55 (citing Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. United 
States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941)). While the University leased 
certain property to the Foundation, the Complaint only 
alleges that the Foundation’s transactions in the student-
housing market are part of an anticompetitive scheme. 
Applying a market-participant exception to these 
circumstances would swallow the rule that “the state does 
not forfeit Parker immunity simply because it acts with a 
private party.” Id. 
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solely from the University’s conduct, we further 
conclude that the University’s immunity also shields the 
Foundation. See supra Section IV. 
B 
 Plaintiffs have not pled that members of the 
Foundation constituted a “controlling number of 
decisionmakers” within the University. Dental Exam’rs, 
135 S. Ct. at 1114. It could be the case, for example, that 
members of the Foundation’s board of directors 
constituted a majority of the University’s Council of 
Trustees. If such facts exist, Midcal’s active-supervision 
requirement could be applicable. Id. Given that 
possibility, amendment may not be futile and we will 
remand with instructions that the Amended Complaint be 
dismissed without prejudice to plaintiffs’ right to file a 
second amended complaint. See, e.g., Estate of Lagano v. 
Bergen Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 769 F.3d 850, 861 (3d 
Cir. 2014). 
VII 
 We will affirm in part on the alternative grounds 
set forth above and reverse and remand with instructions 
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that the Amended Complaint be dismissed without 
prejudice. 
